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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD THEODORE SUNDQUIST, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MARY ALICE SUNQUIST LEARY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE NO. 17057 
The respondent disagrees with appellant's statement of facts 
in some instances. 
Appellant states that it was conceded that a trust existed. 
The testimony and argument was that no trust existed, but if one 
existed it was for a reasonable time period which has expired. 
Appellant states that there was no evidence that the chil-
dren did not intend to continue with their education and that 
they were, at the time of the hearing, pursuing their higher 
education. The evidence was that they were at most taking 
classes only sporadically. 
There are additional facts not stated in appellant's brief 
which should be added. The divorce decree dated in October 1973 
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ordered that plaintiff and defendant should establish a family 
trust and that plaintiff and defendant should act as trustees 
(T.49). Instead of creating such a trust, appellant's attorney 
drafted a trust document wherein a bank was to act as trustee. 
Appellant and respondent both signed said document, but the bank 
~1 
did not. Mr. Sundquist conceded that trust was never in effect 1 
(T .108 p. 40) . That document was not introduced in evidence. 
The parties set up a joint bank account in their two names, 
which account was designated as a trust account, but no terms of:~ 
any trust are in evidence. Appellant testified: 
Q. What trust are you referring to? 
A. The one we both signed back in 1973. 
Q. It was never, therefore, in effect; correct? 
A. That's right. I was acting as if it were in effect, 
however. 
(T.108 ps.39, 40) 
Income from property in California was placed in a joint account. ~ 
Occasionally sums were drawn out for educational expenses for·: 
each of the three children (T.108 p.16). 
At the time of the hearing the children were ages 24, 22 and ( 
19. 
Alyce, age 24, had attended a full year of college in 1975 :: 
and then sporadically took a few clases, including guitar theory: 
and beginning bicycling. She was married in 1978 and is present-
ly living in San Diego (T.108 ps.11, 12, 13). At the time of the~ 
hearing she was attending Mesa College in San Diego, taking six ~ 
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one-half hours. She submitted to the court a written state-
ment · h saying t at she would leave the matter to the court's dis-
cretion as to whether or not a trust, if one existed, should be 
terminated (Ex. D-2). 
Matt' age 22, had not graduated from high school. He had 
obtained a certificate through a GED program. At the time of the 
hearing he was working as a truck driver. He had taken no col-
lege courses until the quarter in effect at the time of the 
hearing, and he was then taking a three-hour course at the 
University of Utah in educational psychology (T .108, p .13). He 
agreed that if a trust existed it should be terminated (Ex. D-1). 
Joel, age 19, had graduated from high school. He took one 
quarter at the University of Utah and then enlisted in 1979 for a 
four-year enlistment in the Army. At the time of the hearing he 
was stationed in Germany where he had college courses available 
to him given by the University of Maryland. The government would 
pay three-fourths of the costs thereof. He was not attending any 
of them. There is a program available to him whereby if he 
contributes fifty dollars a month during his enlistment, the Army 
will contribute seventy-five dollars, which would make a tot~l of 
$7,200 at the end of four years to be used for educational bene-
fits after his enlistment terminates (T.108 ps.13-15). Joel made 
no request for any funding of his education in Germany (T .108, 
p. 38). He submitted a written statement to the court that he 
would like to remain impartial as to whether or not the trust, if 
one existed, should be terminated (Ex.D-3). 
3 
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Their mother assumed that if the children wanted a college Tl 
education they would treat the matter seriously and if they in 
intended to attend college they would do so, not just sporadi-
cally taking a few courses. The funds have been available for )16 
seven years for their education (T .108 p .16). The mother is in :;ec 
favor of their continuing education and has proffered to contri- ·f-; 
.~ V"'" 
bute thereto, but wants to avoid the continuous friction which . 
:~L 
was created by having funds in a joint bank account with her 
ex-husband (T.76). 
She testified that if the trust were terminated: 
... then we won't have any reason to have these problems and 
have to be coming into court every couple years on this 
matter. And I feel that if it's terminated both Mr. 
Sundquist and I can help the children individually, if we 
wish to do so, with their education. In other words, as far 
as I can see, they'd be getting money from both of us inde-
pendently, rather than from one source; but they would still 
be getting help if he wished to help them and if I wished to 
help them. And I have told all three of them that I would 
help them. (T.108 ps.15-16) 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO TRUST WAS CREATED 
The decree of divorce ordered the parties to create a trust. 
The parties signed a trust agreement drafted by counsel for Mr. 
Sundquist. That agreement named, however, a bank as trustee and 
called for the signature of the bank. The bank did not sign it 
and therefore there was no trust agreement. In fact, Mr. 
Sundquist concedes that agreement was never in effect. Mr. 
Sundquist testified: 
Q. It was never therefore in effect? 
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There was no trust document before the court, none having been 
introduced in evidence (T.108 ps.50-51). 
The appellant cites Loco Credit Union v. Reed, 85 NM 729, 
516 P.2d 1112 (New Mexico 1973), as authority that a trust was 
created. In that case the parties had to do nothing further to 
create a trust. The decree did not order them to create a trust 
but rather adjudicated that a fund became a trust res. In this 
case at bar parties were ordered to create a trust with them-
selves as trustees, and the evidence shows that this was never 
done. 
Here, Judge Swan stated: 
Th~ Court would find that the parties have appeared before 
this Court on several occasions in an effort to agree on 
some method of managing the funds, and that the stipulations 
and subsequent Court orders, including the addendum to the 
trust agreement marked as Exhibit C, and this Court's amen-
ded order dated October 29th, 1976, which is based upon a 
written stipulation of the parties, all deal with methods of 
handling these funds. 
This Court, Mr. Swope, just has to find that the parties 
never did in fact establish a written trust. And whether 
their conduct could be construed as the establishment of a 
trust, the terms are so uncertain and ambiguous that this 
Court cannot define either the purpose of the trust, and 
what could be done to accomplish this purpose, what expenses 
would be allowed, or for what period of time, what its 
duration might be. 
As commendable as the intent of the parties might have been 
to provide for, as they have said, the higher education of 
these children, they seem to have lacked the ability to 
provide either the conditions or define the expenditures 
that might properly be made, or for what period of time. 
There's just no document before the Court that could be 
construed as a trust. Anything the Court has would have to 
be a combination of documents together with the evidence 
regarding the conduct of the parties, the accountings. I 
don't believe it's so much a question of whether the trust 
is terminated as it is a question of whether it was ever in 
fact established. 
5 
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Because the Court was involved in making an order requiring 
the creation of the trust, I believe this imposes on the 
Court an obligation in addition to the usual requirement the 
Court would have to apply the law of trusts to these facts, 
and that further obligation is to, at this late date, deter-
mine whether the parties have in fact complied with the 
Court orders in the decree of divorce. And regardless of 
the good intentions they may have had, I think they have not 
done so. This is no reflection on their present counsel, 
because they were not involved. Mr. Swope was not at all 
involved in the lawsuit, and it appears that Mr. Yano was 
attorney and attempted to set up a trust pursuant to the 
Court order. 
For the Court to now attempt to define the terms and condi-
tions under which a trustee would perform, would require 
this Court to make decisions which are uncertain and ambi-
guous under the agreement or the stipulations of the par-
ties. The Court would be speculating, at best, in imposing 
on the parties some conditions that may or may not have been 
their intent and purpose. 
I'm afraid, Mr. Sundquist and Mrs. Leary, the parties have 
failed in this effort, as they did in the marriage itself. 
Since the decree of divorce, the parties have failed to put 
together a trust that they had agreed to do, and that the 
Court ordered them to do; but instead merely managed some 
funds, that the evidence shows they were managed. I think 
that does not create a trust. 
I think at this point the Court has to conclude that the 
only course available to the Court is to order the assets 
distributed equally to the parties. And counsel will 
observe the intent of the parties. If they wish to then 
establish a meaningful and legal trust for these parties, 
they can do so. But they will be separate trusts, not one 
administered together. 
(T.108 ps.49-51) 
Such determination is supported by the evidence. 
II. IF A TRUST HAD BEEN CREATED, IT WAS FOR 
A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD WHICH HAS EXPIRED. 
The divorce decree provided that the parties should create a 
trust and, 
... that funds be accumulated for the education of the minor 
children of the parties and at such time as the children 
have received or terminated their advanced education any 
sums remaining in said trust funds should be equally divided 
between the plaintiff and defendant. (T.108 p.49) 
6 
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Judge Swan further ruled that if this court, pursuant to an 
appeal, should rule that a trust was created, the funds, never-
theless, should be distributed to appellant and respondent, the 
residuary beneficiaries, because the time period for the duration 
of the trust has expired. The final distribution date was not a 
date certain, but rather was at such time as "the children have 
received or terminated their advanced education." Applying usual 
rules of construction, that indefinite time must be determined by 
deciding what time is reasonable for their receiving their edu-
cation. Judge Swan made findings of fact which, being supported 
by the evidence, should be controlling on appeal: 
11. In the event on appeal the court's ruling herein that 
no trust was created is reversed, the court further finds 
that the time and duration of any trust which might have 
been created is uncertain and that a reasonable time for 
duration of the .trust has elapsed and the trust has termi-
nated. (T. 98) 
A reasonable interpretation of the evidence fully supports 
such a conclusion. A twenty-four year old housewife who is occa-
sionally taking a few courses might very well be taking them when 
she becomes a grandmonther. She has told the court she has no 
objection to termination. The twenty-two year old son who didn't 
graduate from high school, and seven years after the existence of 
the trust was taking his first college course of three hours, is 
hardly dedicated to higher learning. He has suggested termi-
nation. The nineteen year who enlisted in the Army for four 
years, and who is not taking advantage presently of opportunities 
available to him for college, has told the court that he has no 
objection to termination. The court's conclusion that the chil-
7 
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dren have had a reasonable time to receive their advanced edu-
cation is a reasonable one. 
Appellant cites Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), 
apparently as authority for the proposition that a trust must 
continue until all of the beneficiaries consent to its termi-
nation. In the Clayton case the trust was for the benefit of the 
settlor for life, then to his son for life, and upon the death of 
the son to the issue of the son. At the time of settler's death 
he was survived by a son and four grandchildren. The trust 
contained no reserved right to terminate. The court held that 
any attempt by the settlor to transfer trust assets after the 
creation of the trust, was ineffective because the residuary 
beneficiaries could not be determined prior to the death of the 
son; and therefore, there could be no termination of the trust by 
agreement of the beneficiaries because the beneficiaries could 
not yet be ascertained. All the court was saying in Clayton was 
that there can be no termination of an irrevocable trust prior to 
the expiration of the trust period without the consent of all 
beneficiaries. The court was not saying that if the trust period 
has expired consent of beneficiaries would be need~d for termi-
nation. Here, Judge Swan simply adjudicated that the trust 
period had expired and the trust therefore had terminated. 
Furthermore, all of the beneficiaries except the residual 
beneficiary, Mr. Sundquist, have consented to such determination 
by the court, and he has received his one-half share of the funds 
on hand, as residual beneficiary. One son affirmatively stated 
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he Wanted a termi'nati.'on. The other d h d h t d son an t e aug ter consen e 
to whatever the court determined. 
III. THE ISSUE THAT NO TRUST HAD BEEN CREATED WAS 
RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT 
It is conceded that most of the evidence and argument in the 
court below was directed toward the termination of the relation-
ship because of the continuous conflict between appellant and 
respondent. However, evidence was presented and arguments were 
made relating to the existence or non-existence of the trust. 
The Order to Show Cause was to show cause why "the decree as 
amended herein, which required that a trust fund be created for 
the education of the minor children of the parties, should not be 
terminated and the proceeds distributed equally between the 
plaintiff and defendant." This did not seek the termination of 
the trust as such, but rather the termination of the effect of 
the terms of the decree which provided that a trust be esta-
blished. 
The evidence shows that the bank did not sign any trust 
agreement (T.108 p.40). 
The issue that no trust was created was raised. The Memo-
randum and Election By Children recites: 
The parents then had a trust agreement drafted. . . This 
agreement was signed by the parents but was never executed 
by the proposed trustee. (T.91) 
The comment of the attorney for appellant reflects that the 
question of non-existence of a trust was raised and discussed in 
chambers as well as in open court. He said: 
9 
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Mr. Lowe has commented about the fact that a trustee was not 
appointed in the original document. I would like to quote 
language from 76 Am.Jur. 2.nd, Trusts, Section 32: 'Not-
withstanding that a provision for the office of a trustee is 
essential to the creation and existence of a trust, the 
nomination of a trustee is not; and the fact that the person 
nominated as trustee may be incompetent or disqualified, or 
may refuse to accept the trust or to continue in office, 
does not affect the validity of the trust ... 
(T. 108 ps. 46-4 7) 
Even if the issue of the non-existence of the trust had not 
been raised, Rule lS(b) U.R.C.P. provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express 
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in 
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. 
By implication plaintiff, by not objecting to consideration of 
the issue of non-signing of the trust agreement, consented to' 
have the court consider same. 
Relief should be granted regardless of pleadings. 
54(c)(l) U.R.C.P. provides: 
Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. 
IV. THERE BEING NO TRUST, NO ATTORNEYS' 
FEES TO ENFORCE THE TRUST SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
Rule 
The court ruled there was no trust, therefore attorn_ey' s 
fees to enforce a trust were inappropriate. Even if there were a 
trust, no attorneys' fees should have been awarded to resist the 
distribution of the assets in the trust to the residual benefi-
ciaries who were entitled thereto upon the expiration of the time 
period of the trust. 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
The adult children should not indefinitely have a fund 
preserved for their higher education. They have had a reasonable 
opportunity to obtain such education. Both parents have prof-
fered further educational expenses if their offspring desire 
further education. The court came to a reasonable conclusion 
that there was not trust; but that if there were a trust, it bad 
expired and the residual beneficiaries, appellant and respondent, 
should have the fund distributed to them. 
If there were a trust, two of the children consented to let 
the court determine what should be done, and the third affirma-
tively wanted the fund distributed to his parents. 
The appellant is not harmed. As a residual beneficiary of 
one-half of the fund on hand he has received same. 
The ruling should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
~~· ./"". - . /--? ,----·-;::- --;;!_ 7 ,-,,.--fn~. W. L~~~ 
/ torney for Respondent 
11 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Appellant counsel, David 
M. Swope, 820 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on this .2: ~~day of November, 1980. 
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